Kant Makes The Claim In Section I Of His Groundwork For The Metaphysics Of Moral

Kant makes the claim in Section I of his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Moralsthat he is merely making precise and explicit the concept of morality that is already present and operative in common human reason. In other words, Kant thinks that he is just clarifying for us in a philosophical way what ordinary human beings already believe about morality and what serves as the basis (even if unarticulated) of their everyday moral judgments. The questions I would like you to answer for this discussion board are:

1) Do you think Kant is right about this? 

2) Why or why not? 

Please be specific: (a) specify the aspect(s) of Kant’s view that you are reflecting on (for example: the nature of the good will; or that the good will is the only intrinsic good; or that acting from duty is essential to moral actions; or that actions done from inclinations do not have moral content; or that maxims of actions must be universalizable in order for the actions to be moral, etc.; you might also think carefully about Kant’s examples or anything else he says!); and (b) specify your precise reasons for agreeing or disagreeing with the claim that Kant’s view(s) reflect the views of common human reason.